George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister and
Silvio Berlusconi, his Italian counterpart, have been in a political fiddle for
some time now. Mr Berlusconi has been heavily criticised for his monopoly over
the Italian media and his premiership has been plagued by sex scandals. Mr
Papandreou’s austerity programme led to a wave of nationwide strikes and
created divisions in even the upper-most echelons of government.
Nevertheless, their recent resignations were no
doubt triggered by the ultimatum put to them by euro-zone leaders at the G20
summit in Cannes: either reform your economies or clear your desks. Mr
Papandreou was told to approve the latest European bail-out deal or lose his
loans, while Mr Berlusconi was instructed to allow IMF supervision of his
reforms.
Although the European Union (EU) has long
influenced domestic policy, the intrusion of euro leaders into the internal
politics of Italy and Greece is unprecedented in terms of the scale and urgency
of demands. The age-old debate over whether the EU is an intergovernmental or
supranational organisation has resurfaced.
As decisions are increasingly migrated to
Brussels, many voters feel distanced from, and powerless before, those drafting
legislation to which, as citizens, they must abide. But, if the increased
powers afforded to Brussels under the Lisbon treaty weren’t enough, the very
fabric with which Western nations have sewn their political structures, namely
democracy, is under siege.
Both Italy and Greece are now led by governments
that their citizens did not elect. Athens, the city from whence democracy is
believed to have originated in 507 BCE, is now led by Lucas Papademos: an
economic expert he may well be, but elected by popular suffrage, he most
certainly is not. All of this after his predecessor’s term was brought to a
premature end because Mr Papandreou dared to suggest giving the people a say on
austerity, by means of a referendum.
Although we are betraying democratic principles
which, as Western citizens, have been sold to us as the fairest form of
governance, might technocracy be the only answer in such challenging
times? Currently, Italian 10-year bond
yields are above the 7 per cent mark; a level that previously drove Portugal,
Greece and Ireland to seek European bailouts. If Italy goes under, so too may
the rest of the euro-zone. Decisions as urgent as these cannot afford to sit on
the shelves of 17 national parliaments before consensus is reached.
Might, in certain situations, technocracy be just?
Both Italy and Greece chose to join the single currency, and in doing so,
agreed to a number of spoken, and unspoken rules. In any union, recklessness by
one member endangers the existence of others. If Italy and Greece had not amassed
such debts over years of poor financial governance, they would not be
experiencing such difficulties today. Should not those countries that provide
financial help to the union’s ailing members have a right to impose conditions
upon the loans?
In the long-term, some forms of technocracy are
also necessary. Independent institutions, such as the unelected European
Commission are needed to provide stability and consistency as power switches
between different political parties. Such independent institutions are also
preferable to an intergovernmental body dominated by a few powerful members,
such as Germany and France.
Nevertheless, the technocrats also have their
limits. Economics, although often presented as such, is not a science. Its
application has such profound implications for people’s lives, that
macroeconomic decisions, whether made by elected politicians or by technocrats,
will always be politically contentious.